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Explaining ‘Inertia’ in R&D internationalisation: Norwegian firms and the 
role of home country-effects 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper enquires why firms of different nationalities exhibit different propensities to 
undertake international R&D activities. We focus on reconciling the heterogeneity and 
idiosyncratic behaviour of individual firms in their location of R&D, with the apparent 
similarity in R&D internationalisation patterns by firms of a given nationality. The more 
aggregate evidence on R&D internationalisation points to similarities in internationalisation 
between firms from similarly endowed countries. Our discussion does not preclude the role of 
industry-specific effects, but argues that the three levels of analysis – firm-specific, industry-
specific and country-specific - are indeed complementary and indivisible.  
The starting point of our analysis is the heterogeneity in the propensity of small open 
economies (SOEs) to undertake overseas asset-developing activities. Some have generalised 
that SOEs -which are both supply and demand constrained- locate a larger proportion of their 
value adding activities overseas, and a considerable amount of their innovative capacity, 
relative to larger, better endowed economies. However, the variation between SOEs is 
considerable: firms from countries such as Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands demonstrate 
such tendencies, while firms from countries such as Norway, Austria and Finland are less 
inclined to do so. Indeed, supply and demand constraints due to size do not seem to be the 
primary explanation, with firms from larger countries such as Italy and Japan exhibiting a 
similar reluctance to internationalise their innovative activities.  
 This paper seeks to examine the reasons underlying this discrepancy, and in particular 
to understand the role of home-country effects on firms’ reluctance to internationalise their 
R&D. We take the example of Norway, using data based on interviews with the major R&D 
performers in Norwegian industry.   
 There are undoubtedly several complex forces at play which determine the extent and 
location of innovation from the firms and strategic perspective, and which have been the 
object of numerous other studies examining the centripetal and centrifugal forces underlying 
the innovative activities of firms (see e.g., Granstand, Hakanson and Sjolander 1994, Niosi 
1999, Granstand 1998). We accept that ‘inertia’ in R&D internationalisation certainly reflects 
all these issues. Our contribution in this article is to focus and expand on the complex 
interplay between several country-specific issues that determine internationalisation – or in 
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this case, non-internationalisation – of R&D by firms. In particular, we focus on the extent to 
which firms are embedded and interdependent on the external (but national) actors that 
comprise the national innovation systems and determine the industrial specialisation of firms, 
their competitiveness and the extent to which they are embedded. While understanding the 
centripetal nature of supply-side issues is not novel, we take a more holistic approach, 
examining both exogenous (factor-endowments based aspects) and endogenous (government 
institutions and regulatory aspects) issues. While the nature of comparative advantages act as 
an exogenous factor, a priori creating bounds on what is possible, the industrial structure in 
‘reluctant’ internationalising economies also tends to exhibit the effects of inward-looking 
economic policy orientation and a certain level of techno-nationalism, and acts (in certain 
instances) to constrict both inward foreign direct investment (FDI), and to an extent at least – 
impedes outward activity. In other words, firms - both small and large –may be ‘locked-in’ to 
the local innovation systems, since the level of interaction and the extent of interdependence 
is difficult to duplicate elsewhere. In addition, the specialisation of the innovation systems 
changes only very gradually, and often firms have to respond more rapidly to the changing 
global competitive environment than the domestic milieu allows. Thus, firms are pushed – 
reluctantly- to seek complementary assets which the home location cannot provide as 
efficiently.  
 
Country effects and internationalisation 
There is considerable evidence – particularly on a macro- and meso-economic level - that 
firms from SOEs tend to demonstrate a higher propensity to internationalise their value 
adding activities than firms from larger economies (see e.g., Freeman and Lundvall 1988). 
The reasons for this are uncontroversial. From a demand perspective, the relatively limited 
domestic market size means that if such firms are to achieve economies of scale in 
production, they must seek additional markets to that of their home location in order to 
increase their de facto market size1 (Walsh 1988, Narula 1996, Bellak and Cantwell 1997). 
From a supply perspective, the smallness of their economies means that they have limited 
resources, in terms of capital (both financial and human) as well as in terms of natural and 
created assets, such that firms from these countries tend to be specialised in a few sectors. The 
industrial structure of SOEs tends to demonstrate a ‘niche’ character, with a high level of 
specialisation in few areas, where firms act as specialist suppliers, and thereby show a low 
                                                 
1 The issue here is to seek access to markets, which may firms may do either through exports or FDI. 
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level of product diversification. Bellak and Cantwell (1997) posit that these sectors will tend 
to be those in which they can achieve price-setter positions.  
For similar reasons, industrial policy in these countries tends to support this 
specialisation, because governments have a choice between spreading their limited resources 
thinly across many industries, or concentrating them in a few targeted industries. Thus, if 
firms from SOEs require inputs not available locally and they must therefore seek these in 
overseas locations. It is a well-known observation that this specialisation is reflected in the 
structure and distribution of their domestic industry, as well as their trade and FDI (see e.g., 
Cantwell 1989, Narula 1996). In the case of international production, the tendency to 
internationalise (in an absolute sense and in terms of foreign production as a percentage of 
total production), is less clear cut. Belgium, Netherlands and Sweden, for instance, 
demonstrate a high level of internationalisation of value-adding activities, while countries 
such as Norway and Austria (and until recently, Finland) have shown a dogged preference for 
concentrating their value-adding activities at home, preferring to focus on exports and 
licensing.  Such heterogeneity in internationalisation tends also extends to larger economies, 
suggesting that in fact, smallness per se may not be the primary consideration.  Indeed, 
Dunning and Narula (1996) argue that the propensity to engage in international production 
depends on the balance between the home country’s natural and created assets, which in turn, 
is a function of its resource structure, its market size, and its policy orientation.  
 The basic point that we wish to emphasise here is relatively uncontroversial: there 
exists a fundamental interdependence between the home country national systems and the 
technological competitiveness of their firms. The national systems of innovation (NSI) 
concept suggests that there exist certain structural influences (scientific, political, and socio-
economic) within any nation state that help to define that pattern, nature and extent of 
knowledge accumulation within a given industry, which also defines the extent and nature of 
industrial innovation within its borders. At a more general level, there are national systems 
that support business activities, much like the NSI concept. 
The use of the word ‘system’ does not necessarily mean that the various influences 
that underpin the generation of industrial innovation are systematically organised (Nelson and 
Rosenberg 1993). Far from it. Indeed, it is probably more accurate to say that the NSI in most 
cases represents the serendipitous intertwining of institutions and economic actors within 
industry which defined the stock of knowledge in a given location2. Because of the path 
                                                 
2 This is one of the primary arguments for the ‘triple helix’ approach proposed by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 
(2000). 
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dependent nature of technology, they are likely to continue playing a defining role in the 
kinds of technological activities of firms. As such, changes in one institution due to, say, a 
change in the educational priorities of a new government, are likely to affect other 
institutions, and eventually, the nature of innovatory activities of firms within given 
industries, thereby influencing the process and extent of technological learning in future 
periods.  
Technological accumulation is incremental, and highly path-dependent, whether one 
views it from a firm, industry or national perspective. Thus, technological specialisation 
patterns are distinct across countries, despite the economic and technological convergence 
associated with economic globalisation (Archibugi and Pianta 1992, Narula 1996). Other 
studies have shown that these patterns of technological specialisation are fairly stable over 
long periods (see Cantwell 1989, Zander 1995) and change only very gradually. The kinds of 
technologies across countries have shown to have converged because of, inter alia, increasing 
cross-border competition and the increasing interdependence of economic actors in different 
locations. Cantwell and Sanna-Randaccio (1990) have shown, for instance, that firms seek to 
emulate the technological advantages of leading competitors in the same industry, regardless 
of their national location. Similarly, Narula and Hagedoorn (1999) have shown that firms seek 
to engage in R&D alliances with technological leaders in the same industry, irrespective of 
their national origins.   
Note that the increasing similarity of technological assets across countries has not 
made their technological advantages identical (Narula 1996). In part, this is because a 
majority of the activities of firms- and in particular their innovative activities- tend to be 
concentrated in their home location. Since the NSI of the home country is idiosyncratic, path-
dependent and stable, the specialisation of their firm’s activities are also broadly speaking 
specialised in these same sectors, despite their increasing international involvement through 
overseas value adding activities (Narula 1996). Indeed, this in part reflects the fact that the 
R&D activities – particularly those directed towards more fundamental research activities –
tend to be conducted closer to headquarters. 
Explaining inertia and heterogeneity in R&D Internationalisation 
Studies on the internationalisation of R&D have linked the theories that underlay the location 
of international production to explain the location of the R&D activities of firms. R&D can be 
said to internationalise for broadly the same motives as traditional elements of the value 
added chain, although not at the same rate, nor to the same extent. Two primary types of R&D 
activity have been identified within this approach.  
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First, firms internationalise their R&D because of the need to improve the way in 
which existing assets are utilised. That is, firms may seek to promote the use of their 
technological assets in conjunction with, or in response to, specific locational conditions in a 
foreign locale.  This has been dubbed as asset-exploiting R&D (Dunning and Narula 1995) or 
home-base exploiting (HBE) activity (Kuemmerle 1996). Locational conditions may require 
some level of modification to the product or processes in order to make them more 
appropriate to local conditions, or in some cases, to create peripheral products. Such R&D is 
primarily production-supportive, and (within the classification developed by Hood and Young 
1982) leads to the establishment of support laboratories (SL), or locally integrated laboratories 
(LIL). In such activities, the technological advantages of the firm primarily reflect those of the 
home country.  
Unsurprisingly, the heterogeneous internationalisation behaviour observed with 
regards international production extends to R&D activities. This is because a large percentage 
of the foreign-located R&D activities of firms tends to be production-supportive (i.e., HBE), 
the demand-side considerations are significant. Countries with a higher involvement in 
foreign production also demonstrate a higher proclivity towards foreign-located R&D. The 
level of foreign R&D in any given host location is however, also dependent on the kinds of 
value adding activity undertaken there. Trade supportive activities or minor assembly-type 
operations are less likely to result in much demand driven R&D activity. Where the 
production activities are more intensive, such as with efficiency-seeking FDI, will have more. 
In general, the more embedded the foreign subsidiary, and the greater the intensity of the 
value-adding activity, the greater the amount of R&D activity. Such activities lead to an 
duplication of its home base activities, since the host location is acting as a substitute for 
activities it may have wished, ceteris paribus, to undertake at home (Zander 1999), but find 
that it can undertake these more efficiently elsewhere.  
The second broad classification is that of strategic asset-seeking activity (Dunning and 
Narula 1995) or home-base augmenting (HBA) activity (Kuemmerle 1996). In such kinds of 
investments, firms aim to improve their existing assets, or to acquire (and internalise) or 
create completely new technological assets through foreign-located R&D facilities. The 
assumption in such cases is that the foreign location provides access to location advantages 
which are not as easily available in the home base. In many cases the location advantages 
sought are associated with the presence of other firms. The investing firm may seek to acquire 
access to the ownership advantages of other firms, either through spillovers (in which case the 
firm seeks benefits that derive from economies of agglomeration), by direct acquisition 
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(through M&A), or through R&D alliances. In the Hood and Young classification, these R&D 
facilities might represent internationally integrated laboratories (IIL). 
 HBE activity, broadly speaking, represents a duplication of R&D work undertaken at 
home, while HBA activity represents a diversification into new scientific areas. Zander 
(1999), in a study of Swedish MNEs, further expands this taxonomy of international 
innovation networks. He proposes that although it is possible to argue, as others have done 
(e.g., Patel and Vega 1999, Dunning and Narula 1995), that international duplication of R&D 
activities is in fact an indication of technological strength of the home base, whereas when 
firms diversify, it reflects a weakness in the home base, but a strength in the host location. But 
Zander goes further, explaining that a dichotomous view is a simplification of a complex 
system, given that firms are different and are often engaged in several kinds of  activity 
simultaneously. Indeed, his results suggest that there exists a continuum in terms of 
diversification and duplication, each not being independent of the other. That is to say, firms 
may seek to both duplicate and diversify, depending on the nature, diversity and intensity of 
their activities. 
Supply issues are crucial in explaining the heterogeneity of firms in their extent of 
R&D activity. It is important to note that not all supply-side issues result in HBA R&D 
activity. First, firms may seek assets that are not associated with innovatory activities, as is 
the case where resource-seeking investments are undertaken. For instance, the home country 
may have a comparative disadvantage in unskilled labour, or a natural resource that represents 
a crucial input to its value adding process. So while such investment is essentially home-base 
augmenting, it does not necessarily involve R&D. This is an important form of FDI for MNEs 
from all countries regardless of size. It is when the firm seeks complementary assets in non-
generic, knowledge-intensive, and location bound assets which it cannot have access (or as 
cheaply) to in its home base, that firms engage in HBA activities through FDI.  The growth of 
HBE activity by MNEs since the mid 1980s or so by a variety of authors (see e.g., Florida 
1997, Kuemmerle 1996). It is important to note that there is considerable variety in the kinds 
of activity that can be so defined. First, firms may seek to establish ‘listening posts’ which 
essentially monitor the activities of other firms and institutions in a particular environment. 
Such listening posts have a low R&D intensity, as their role is primarily that of technological 
reconnaissance, and not R&D per se. Such activities seek indirect spillovers, but do so 
deliberately and tend to be small in size. At the other extreme, firms may engage in R&D in a 
foreign location to avail themselves of complementary assets that are location specific (and 
include those that are firm-specific or institution-specific, which the laboratory in question 
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seeks to use through collaboration). That is, such technological activities aim explicitly to 
internalise several aspects of the NSI of the host location, by seeking direct spillovers, in 
addition to indirect spillovers. Such facilities may be small or large, depending largely on the 
resources and the objectives of the parent firm.  
Despite the problem created by the aggregation of data, the evidence unambiguously 
suggests that firms from certain countries show a markedly similar tendency towards 
centralising their R&D activities, while others show a strong bias towards internationalisation. 
For instance, Japan has long represented the exception amongst large economies, with its 
MNEs exhibiting a low level of R&D internationalisation (e.g., Pearce and Singh 1992, Patel 
and Pavitt 1998). Despite the considerable level of internationalisation of the sales and 
production of its firms, its level of international R&D activity has remained at a modest level. 
Two complementary explanations exist (Belderbos 1999, 2000). First, that this is simply a 
corollary of ‘latecomer’ status of Japanese firms in internationalisation generally. That is, 
because Japanese firms have internationalised their production activities only relatively 
recently, and it is reasonable to expect a lag before they engage in substantial levels of 
international R&D activity. Second, that this reflects unique characteristics of Japanese 
management, and of their linkages with the domestic innovation system.  At the risk of 
oversimplifying, the latter argument is that firms that dominate Japanese international 
activities are to a great extent large MNEs which are ‘core’ members of the Keiretsu. These 
firms are deeply embedded in the Japanese science and technology base, and this century-long 
interdependence3 between these firms and the innovation systems in Japan has created an 
inertia amongst these firms, and a consequent bias towards home-base activities, and –until 
quite recently - a preference to augment technological assets through external or quasi-
external means4. What we are trying to suggest here is that this dual argument may be 
generalised to a larger group of countries. Similar low levels of R&D internationalisation has 
also been noted for firms from other countries, including the Austria, New Zealand, Norway 
and Italy5. Although there are industry-specific tendencies resultant from their industrial 
structure (discussed later), these countries also have innovation systems that are ‘tight’ in the 
sense they have in the past been closed (or at least had high barriers of entry) to new (but 
particularly foreign) entrants, and generally speaking display a certain level of ‘techno-
                                                 
3 Although the keiretsu are a post war phenomenon, they have broadly the same group membership as the pre-
war conglomerates called the zaibatsu. 
4 See Dunning and Narula (1994), Pearce and Papanastassiou (1996), Belderbos (1999, 2000) 
5 As Patel and Pavitt (1998) show, high levels of international production do not automatically translate to high 
levels of international R&D. 
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nationalism’, often demonstrated through their low levels of penetration of inward FDI. 
Economic policy may, in some cases, have been explicit through the use of a strong import-
substituting stance, and a strong centrally-orchestrated technology policy. Indeed, such 
behaviour has been quite common amongst a number of SOEs (Davenport and Bibby 1999), 
but is by no means limited to them. Such habits die hard, and the close-knit relationships 
developed through such policies remain strong, long after the policies that created them have 
been abandoned. Despite this, the evidence that innovation is becoming increasingly 
internationalised is quite strong (see e.g., Archibugi and Iammarino 2000). Some of this 
growth has occurred through non-conventional, quasi-internalised modes, such as strategic 
technology partnering (see e.g., Narula and Hagedoorn 1999). Indeed, both internal and 
external R&D activities show an increasing overlap. That is, firms establish R&D facilities 
overseas partly in order to develop and maintain external networks of relationships with local 
counterparts (Zanfei 2000).  
But the need to create durable linkages with the innovation systems of a host location 
– especially where the firm is seeking mainly to duplicate its technological profile overseas - 
is tempered by a high level of integration with the innovation system in the home location. 
Such linkages are both formal and informal, and will probably have taken years – if not 
decades – to create and sustain. Frequently, the most significant issues are the ‘know-who’. 
Government funding institutions, suppliers, university professors, private research teams, 
informal networks of like-minded researchers take considerable effort to create, and once 
developed, have a low marginal cost of maintaining. Even where the host location is 
potentially superior to the home location - and where previous experience exists in terms of 
other value adding activities-the high costs of becoming familiar with, and integrating into a 
new location may be prohibitive. Keep in mind that firms are constrained by resource 
limitations, and that some minimum threshold size of R&D activities exist in every distinct 
location.  As such, to maintain more than one facility with a threshold level of researchers 
must mean that the new (host) location must offer significantly superior spillover 
opportunities, or provide access to complementary resources that are simply not available 
anywhere else, and which cannot be acquired by less risky means more efficiently. Where 
firms simply seek to duplicate their home activities abroad, the decentralisation imperative is 
still less powerful. This may be achieved more simply by strategic alliances, in addition to 
which, of course, improvements in information and communication technologies (ICTs) have 
further reduced the need for physical proximity.  This may also explain in part the growing 
use of M&A activity with regards to R&D. An acquired laboratory short-circuits the time 
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taken to develop such linkages vis-à-vis a greenfield laboratory, as they come with ready-
made networks and linkages (Narula 1999a). However, acquired laboratories bring with them 
the difficulty of integrating them efficiently into the internal network of the firm, such that 
their efficiency may be limited, at least initially (Belderbos 1999).  
It seems clear, nonetheless, that allowing for differences in the motivation to conduct 
overseas R&D (which may themselves derive from simple firm- and industry-specific 
differences), geographical proximity to host locations is important in determining the location 
of R&D, in both the case of supply and demand-driven R&D activity. However, Blanc and 
Sierra (1999) point out that that internal proximity between overseas R&D and the rest of the 
MNE is an equally important issue. A dispersion of R&D activities across the globe also 
requires extensive coordination between them – and particularly with headquarters- if they are 
to function in an efficient manner with regards to the collection and dissemination of 
information. This acts as a centripetal force on R&D, and accounts for a tendency of firms to 
locate R&D (or at least the most strategically significant elements) closer to headquarters.  
Such growing complex linkages, both of networks internal to the firm, and those 
between external networks and internal networks, require complex coordination if they are to 
provide optimal benefits (see Zanfei 2000 for a discussion). Such networks are not only 
difficult to manage, but also require considerable resources (both managerial and financial). It 
is no surprise, therefore, that external technology development is primarily the domain of 
larger firms with greater resources, and more experience in trans-national activity (Hagedoorn 
and Schakenraad 1994, Castellani and Zanfei 1998). SMEs are generally not in a position to 
undertake such activity. While it is true that ICTs have improved coordination, the importance 
of ‘being there’ and having direct contact remains especially important in R&D, where much 
of the knowledge is not only tacit and largely uncodifiable, but embodied in people.  
Thus it seems reasonable to expect that large firms to undertake a higher level of R&D 
overseas, although in proportion this may be the same as smaller firms. Indeed, this is the 
conclusion made by Patel and Vega (1999), among others. Small firms are constrained by 
their limited resources – the expansion of R&D activities- both at home and in overseas 
locations requires considerable resources both in terms of capital investment,  and managerial 
resources which these firms simply do not have. Ceteris paribus, large firms have more 
money and resources to use on overseas activity. On the other hand, large firms are also more 
likely to have more linkages with the domestic science base, and tend to have a well 
developed network of supplier firms at home. Small firms are generally in the role of supplier 
firm, and as such form part of the network of some larger firm, and are thus also bound to 
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their home location (or the location of their main customers). Internationalisation of supplier 
firms often occurs in tandem with the internationalisation of their primary customer, 
especially where the customer is large and dominant in terms of their market, as has been 
observed with regards Japanese auto manufacturers and their network of supplier firms as the 
auto manufacturers have relocated production to the US and Europe (Florida 1997). However, 
even when such strong customer - supplier links are not the case, small firms are constrained 
by limited resources. R&D is a costly and slow affair, and the long-term horizon that such 
investments need makes overseas R&D facilities an expensive and risky option which is hard 
to justify. Indeed, Belderbos (2000) find that there is a non-linear relationship between firm 
size and overseas R&D, with medium-sized Japanese firms showing a higher propensity (in 
relative terms) to internationalise R&D than small or large sized firms. 
There are also considerable industry-specific differences which encourage or 
discourage centralisation6. As Teece (1986) has argued, the maturity of the technology, and its 
characteristics, determines the extent to which the innovation process can be internalised. 
Obviously, every technological trajectory of each individual firm is unique, since the 
innovation process is path-dependent on previous innovation. In other words, there are 
cognitive limits on what firms can and cannot do (Pavitt 1998).  Most mature technologies 
evolve slowly and demonstrate minor but consistent innovations over time, and can be 
regarded as post-paradigmatic. The technology is to a great extent codifiable, widely 
disseminated, and the property rights well-defined. Innovation is rarely patentable in these 
technologies, where applications development account for most innovatory activity. 
Competition shifts towards price, economies of scale, and downstream activities in order to 
add value, as the original product is priced as a commodity.  These sectors tend to have a low 
R&D intensity. These sectors are generally what Lall (1979) refers to as process industries do 
not require outputs to be tailored to customers to the same extent, or as quickly. This means 
that constant and close interaction between customers is not an important determinant of 
R&D.  Profits of firms are highly dependent on the costs of inputs, and proximity to the 
source of these inputs is often more significant than that of customers. On the other extreme, 
rapidity of technological change in ‘newer’ technologies, or what Lall (1979) refers to as 
engineering industries, require a closer interaction between production and R&D. 
Technologies has a higher tacit, uncodifiable element, and this requires a closer coordination 
between users and producers of innovation.  
                                                 
6 It should also be noted that firms in more mature sectors are more likely to be large, because concentration 
tends to be higher in such sectors than more rapidly evolving sectors.  
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The growing need for firms - particularly in technology intensive sectors - to have 
multiple technological competences is by now also axiomatic. Several contributions, notably 
by Granstand and associates (see e.g., Granstand 1998, Granstand, Patel and Pavitt 1997) 
have noted the growing technological diversification of companies, and more recently, that 
this is associated with a reduction in product diversification over time. Even where products 
are mono-technology-based, the processes used to manufacture them often utilise several 
technologies. Furthermore, within a given technology, there are several technological 
paradigms at play, as firms base products on the current dominant design, yet develop nascent 
technologies with the long-term intention of replacing the current technology with a new 
dominant design. In sectors where a dominant paradigm is not as yet defined, and where 
several disparate technologies are required, interaction with customers and firms with 
complementary technologies, either at home or abroad is greater. 
 What we are trying to highlight here is that the complex – and sometimes contrary -
forces influences the tendency of firms to internationalise, and these occur at both the micro 
and macro levels. On the one hand, there are firm- and technology–specific forces. In 
particular, the need to seek diversity of knowledge, technologies and capabilities to remain 
internationally competitive, and demand issues such as information and proximity to markets. 
In addition, though firms have to deal with organisational issues that derive from the 
complexities of managing different activities and subsidiaries, in order to maintain cohesion 
and internal efficiency of the firm.  
 On the other hand, firms tend to concentrate a large percentage of their innovative 
activities in their home country. This is not surprising since knowledge creation, generation 
and dissemination is highly tacit, difficult to codify and of singular strategic importance to the 
competitiveness of the firm. This means that firms wish to exert as much control over the 
process by keeping R&D close to headquarters, or at any rate, in close proximity to a 
subsidiary which can assure an optimal level of monitoring and control over its activities. This 
acts to create some of the ‘inertia’ in the internationalisation of R&D. In addition, there are a 
high level of interlinkages between, and interdependence on, the innovation systems of the 
host country which acts to create further ‘inertia’. Nonetheless, national systems of innovation 
and industrial and technological specialisation of countries changes only very gradually, and – 
especially in newer, rapidly evolving sectors - much more slowly than the technological needs 
of firms. Firms must seek either to import and acquire the technology they need from abroad, 
or venture abroad and seek to internalise aspects of other countries’ innovation systems. 
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The evidence: R&D activities of Norwegian firms 
 
Data collection  
The survey of Norwegian R&D was based on a questionnaire that was developed in 
cooperation with Robert Pearce of the University of Reading. Although secondary data for 
Norway estimates that about 600 firms comprise the industrial R&D performing sector, a 
large proportion of these firms are SMEs (Hauknes 1996). We selected Norwegian industrial 
firms with R&D expenditures greater than NOK 10 million7 and/or more than 10 R&D 
employees, which gave us a sample of less than 50 firms. Firms that had been acquired by 
foreign investors, but remain autonomous (and therefore Norwegian controlled) were 
included. By excluding all foreign -controlled firms we were left with approximately 35 firms. 
Given the relatively small group of firms that meet our criteria, it was decided to conduct the 
survey through interviews, conducted with the head of the R&D department or equivalent. In 
case of multi-divisional firms, interviews were conducted with several divisions, and 
occasionally on various levels. Given the relatively small sample size, the very specific nature 
of their products and competences, and the small number of firms in each industry, it is 
difficult to give a detailed overview of the firms included in our sample, without breaching 
confidentiality.  Thus, all firm level data used here and identified by individual entities is 
based on publicly available (and therefore non-confidential) data. No information that 
provides specific evidence of individual company strategy has been revealed in this study.  
 
Firm and Industry Specific Issues 
There are two aspects of the economic structure of Norway that are instrumental in defining 
the nature and extent of R&D activity in Norway. First, Norway has traditionally competed on 
factor endowments (see Stonehill 1965, Hodne 1993, Reve et al 1992). Indeed, much of the 
industrial activity in Norway has evolved around upstream activity and value adding to 
resource-based sectors.  According to Reve et al (1992) there are 4 strong industrial clusters, 
and these relate directly to its factor endowments: petroleum, hydropower, metals, and 
maritime industries. Other less ‘complete’ clusters –some of which have lost their 
competitiveness partly as a result of changes in comparative advantage in some natural 
resources - also derive from factor endowments, and include pulp and paper and seafood.  
Second, there has been significant government intervention in the structure of Norwegian 
industry. These have aimed at explicitly creating new areas of industrial specialisation and 
                                                 
7 At the time of the sample selection, NOK 7.5 = US$1 
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have led to the creation of other incomplete clusters, such as telecommunications, 
pharmaceutical and information technologies. Such interventions have occurred consistently 
over the post-war period (and possibly even longer) through several means, which we discuss 
briefly below: 
(1.) The state has promoted the development of energy-intensive sectors, through the 
provision of cheap (and subsidised) hydroelectric energy.  Although these subsidies 
have been drastically reduced, the consistent use of this subsidy is partly responsible 
for the competitive advantages of some of the traditional industrial firms. Indeed, 
Norsk Hydro (the largest industrial concern in Norway) defines itself as an energy 
company, being engaged in both the production of electricity, as well as in sectors all 
of which are energy-intensive. 
(2.)  There have been several waves of restrictions on the activities of foreign-owned firms 
in Norway, both through entry barriers to FDI, and through tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to imports8. These have served to keep the role of FDI in Norway to a low 
level for much of the 20th century. Since the 1990s both governments subsidies and 
restrictions on FDI and imports have drastically been reduced, and in many cases 
eliminated, due to both the GATT and EEA agreements. It is worth noting that the 
OECD estimates that barriers to trade and investment are still on average at least 
double of those in most EU countries, and compared to countries such as Germany, 
UK and Italy more than three times as high (OECD 2000). The restrictions on FDI 
and trade have been abetted by the high level of state ownership in Norway. Although 
some privatisation has occurred, this has been rather minor, and mainly in sectors no 
longer considered strategic, such as in former defence related firms.  
(3.)  During much of the post world War II era, and up to the late 1980s, the Norwegian 
government has intervened in Norwegian industrial development through some level 
of import-substitution industrial policy, targeting the development of certain sectors, 
as well as moulding particular firms into ‘national champions’. From the 1950s, the 
focus was on heavy industry, particularly electro-chemical industries, electro-
metallurgical industries, ship building and the like. The primary asset -and backbone -
of the industrialisation programme was the cheap and plentiful supply of electrical 
power. In the mid-1960s, considerable government investment was made in 
                                                 
8 There have been several waves of nationalisation of foreign-owned assets during the first half of the 20th 
century. In addition, most German assets were acquired by Norway immediately after World War II. Most 
prominent was the acquisition of the majority ownership of Norsk Hydro by the Norwegian state (Stonehill 
1965) 
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‘modernisation’, with a focus on infrastructural projects, particularly 
telecommunications, as well as defence. The core focus was in new technologies, 
focusing on electronics related industries. In the words of one interviewee, ‘up to 
1980, Norway had the most heavily subsidised electronics industry in the world’. 
After the OPEC oil crisis, the emphasis was on developing the petroleum industry 
(Nygaard and Dahlstrom 1992). During each wave, fundamental components of 
industrial policy were: state-ownership, technology transfer by foreign MNEs, and 
preferential treatment for Norwegian firms, firms with Norwegian partners, or firms 
that had transferred significant components of their technological activities to 
Norwegian locations.  
 
These developments have had a significant effect on the industrial structure of Norway, 
creating what is essentially a dichotomous industrial structure. Our data suggests the 
classification of firms into two main groups, which are discussed below.  
 
Group A: traditional industries and formerly protected firms 
Group A consists of what might appear to be two quite different sub-categories, but share 
several important characteristics. The first sub-category are firms in traditional, raw materials-
based sectors9. Many of these may be described as ‘national champions’, and have 
traditionally received a considerable amount of state aid. Indeed, the Norwegian state has 
considerable ownership in some of these firms, most notably, Norsk Hydro (51%10) and 
Statoil (100%). The second sub-category within Group A of firms still operate with a 
competitive advantage that derives partly as a result of protected markets (a result of former 
infant industry protection programs), or hitherto-protected sectors where foreign investment 
has either been discouraged and/or are (or were) nationally owned monopolies11.  
 
                                                 
9 e.g., metal-industrial sectors (such as Norsk Aluminium [aluminium], Elkem [ferro-alloys]), forestry sectors 
(Norske Skog [paper and pulp]), petroleum sector (Statoil, Norsk Hydro) and shipping/seafood sectors (Kvaerner 
[shipbuilding], Mustad [fish hooks, automated fish baiting systems, commercial bait]). 
10 As a result of Norsk Hydro’s acquisition of Saga, the third major Norwegian petroleum company, the state’s 
share in Norsk Hydro fell to 43.8% in 1999. 
11 This category includes companies such as Lilleborg and Norsk Jetmotor11, Dyno Chemicals, Telenor. Note 
that some of these firms have been acquired by foreign competitors as liberalisation has eroded some of their 
competitive advantages. For instance, Norske Jetmotor was acquired by Volvo Aero in 1999, and Dyno was 
acquired in 2000.  
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Group B:  Specialised technology-intensive companies  
The second group consists of firms that are engaged in more knowledge-intensive sectors, and 
can be regarded as science based (‘non-traditional’) firms. Although some of these firms have 
evolved from a supportive or related sectors to these natural-resource based sectors, they have 
gradually diversified or specialised into higher value-adding activities12. Others are firms 
which have always operated in specialised science-based sectors13.  
What we are trying to highlight here is that there have been two main influences on 
the industrial structure of Norwegian industry (Figure 1). The first is associated with both the 
factor endowments of Norway, and the increasing knowledge content of sectors. The second 
is the extent to which Norwegian government policy has been instrumental in defining the 
industrial structure.  
 
***FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
Broadly speaking, our survey has observed that there is considerable difference in the 
way in which firms from these two groups undertake both their domestic R&D activities, and 
the propensity to undertake international R&D activities. Group A accounts for 63.5% of the 
R&D expenditures of our sample, and Group B represent 36.5% of the total R&D 
expenditures of our sample. In general, Group A is also less internationalised in terms of 
sales, with foreign sales representing (on average) 59.4% of total sales, compared to group B 
where overseas sales account for 88.1% (Figure 2). 
***FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
Table 1 gives details of the distribution of our sample in terms of R&D expenditure. 
Two things are obvious from this table. First, that our sample accounts for a large percentage 
of the formal R&D activities undertaken by private companies. Although the total R&D 
expenditures of the firms in our sample represents 63% of BERD, we estimate that 
approximately 10% of BERD is accounted for by foreign-controlled firms14. In addition, one 
of the largest Norwegian MNEs was unable to provide data on its total R&D expenditure 
                                                 
12 An example is Jotun, which started by manufacturing specialised paints for the maritime industry, but has 
diversified into other paint technologies. Lignotech, began life as a wood pulping firm, but has moved towards 
the sale and development of wood-based extracts. 
13 Examples include Synthesis, which manufactures pharmaceutical intermediates, Navia Aviation, which 
produces aviation navigational aids equipment (acquired by Northrop in 2000), ASK-Proxima, which is engaged 
in the production of LCD projectors. Dynal, a spin-off from Dyno is one of the few commercially successful 
biotechnology firms in Norway. Laerdal manufactures highly sophisticated medical diagnosis equipment. Tomra 
dominates the world market for bottle recycling systems. 
14 In particular, 4-5 foreign-owned affiliates (which include ABB, Siemens, Ericsson and Alcatel) account for an 
estimated NOK 1 billion in R&D expenditures.   
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because it was undergoing massive restructuring, and thus was partly excluded (only one of 
its subsidiaries was included). We estimate that this firm alone may account for 3-5% of 
BERD. Thus, we estimate that our sample accounts for anywhere between 70 and 80% of all 
Norwegian controlled BERD. Data from Statistics Norway suggests that there are 
approximately 600 firms that undertake R&D in the business sector. This suggests that 400-
500 firms account for approximately NOK 2 billion, which provides us with an average 
estimate of less than NOK 0.5 million per firm. These figures, although rough, allow us to 
estimate that approximately 80% of firms in Norway which undertake innovation have less 
than one full-time equivalent R&D employee each.  
Indeed, as Table 1 shows, a very large percentage of the R&D activities of Norwegian 
firms are undertaken at a rather small scale, even within our sample. Over 50% of our sample 
have annual R&D expenditures of less than NOK 10 million. In terms of R&D employees, 
there is a similar distribution: 56% of the sample had less than 50 R&D employees, and 76% 
had less than 75 R&D employees. Only 12% of the R&D facilities have more than 200 R&D 
employees.  
 
***TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
***TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
In terms of industrial distribution, 38.5% of the firms could be classified as being 
engaged in low technology sectors, and 30% in electronics and IT sectors (Table 2). Low 
technology sectors include food and beverages, wood and wood products, paper and paper 
products, and fishery equipment. The ‘electronics-based sectors’ include several specialist 
companies that manufacture control equipment for ships, and specialised fishing equipment 
such as sonar’s, in addition to consumer electronics, telecommunications and medical 
diagnosis equipment.   
In terms of employment, a rather small percentage of Norwegian firms are large: only 
about 20% of companies in Norway have more than 500 employees (compared with Sweden 
where more than a third of firms have more than 500 employees) (Hauknes 1996). Although 
Groups A and B are roughly equal in number of firms, corresponding shares of total 
worldwide sales are 93% and 7% respectively, and in terms of employment, the figures are 
84% and 16%. However, in terms of domestic R&D employment, Group A accounts for 70% 
and Group B for about 30%. Table 2 also illustrates that a majority of firms (88.5%) in Group 
A operate in the low tech sectors, while only 46.1% of Group B can be so classified.  
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 ***TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
These data make the following points. Group A consists of a firms which are large, 
which account for a large share of the sales and employment in Norwegian industry, despite 
representing a small percentage of the total firms in Norway, and are concentrated in low 
technology (and non-R&D intensive) sectors. They also tend to be less internationally 
oriented in terms of sales. Group B firms are by and large SMEs, and have a higher propensity 
to be in more R&D intensive sectors, but are more active in terms of overseas sales than 
Group A. In terms of R&D, Group A firms have on average only 5.0% of their R&D 
employees outside Norway, compared to 28.9% for Group B, despite the fact that on average 
Group A firms are on average several times larger in terms of their total operations (Table 3). 
These differences not only reflect the extent to which these traditional and protected firms are 
embedded into the local economy, but also the fact that most of these companies are engaged 
in low R&D intensive sectors, while Group B firms are engaged in more R&D intensive 
sectors. In addition, the differences are even greater in terms of overseas activities: the ratio of 
R&D employees to total worldwide employees is 3 times higher for Group B than Group A, 
while the ratio of foreign R&D employees to total worldwide R&D employees is 6 times 
greater for Group B than Group A. Indeed, even in terms of absolute number of overseas 
R&D employees, Group B has almost 3 times as many employees as Group A, despite the 
fact that in terms of revenues, they account for slightly over 10% of the total revenues of our 
sample.   
 
***TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
 To what extent do these differences in R&D internationalisation reflect differences in 
the internationalisation of production and sales? Table 4 gives details of the activities of our 
sample of firms with regards these three elements. These percentage reflects the number of 
regions in which firms have sales, production or R&D, and not the intensity or the value of 
these activities15. The evidence indicates the following facts. First, that there is no significant 
difference in the extent of overseas of sales and production, apart from the fact that several of 
Group A firms had no overseas activities. However, on the whole, Group B firms were more 
                                                 
15 Many of the interviewed firms were unwilling to provide data on level of sales or production for their foreign 
affiliates.  
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evenly involved across regions. 85.7% of Group B firms can be regarded as being ‘global’ in 
terms of their sales activities, with sales in at least 5 of the 6 non-home regions, compared 
with just 45.5% of Group A firms. A larger percentage of Group A firms were involved in 
production in the EU compared with Group B, but the difference was marginal. Firms in 
Group A generally regarded themselves as ‘eurocentric’16. In contrast, Group B firms took a 
more global view of their competitiveness. In terms of production, Group B firms were more 
highly concentrated in three regions: the EU, North America and Asia, but only 7.1% could 
be regarded to be ‘global’, and only 50% had ‘multinational’ operations. Group B firms 
undertook production in many more locations, and 18.2% of the respondents were ‘global’ in 
their geographic spread, and 63.6% ‘multinational’ in scope.  
 With regards R&D, however, Group B firms had a higher overseas presence, with 
42.9% of firms with R&D in both the EU and North America. Corresponding figures for 
Group A are 27.3% and 9.1% (Table 4). 35.7% of Group B firms could be regarded as 
‘multinational’ in terms of geographic spread of R&D compared with 9.1% for Group A.  
As we have discussed in a previous section, a large proportion of R&D activities (both 
home-based and international) have as a primary purpose the objective of supporting 
production activities. Norwegian industry is a relatively newcomer to outward FDI, having 
only begun to invest in earnest in the 1970s (Hodne 1993). Thus, although there is a high 
dependence on overseas sales, production has only begun to be relocated much more recently. 
To some extent, therefore, it is reasonable to expect a low overseas intensity of production, as 
has been the case with Japanese FDI – much of the activities of Japanese firms had, until the 
late 1980s concentrated on assembly-type activities (Dunning and Narula 1994) or sales-
supportive activities. Likewise, the level of foreign R&D intensity was also low.  In the case 
of Group A, (and especially traditional industries), FDI was undertaken to access lower cost 
resource inputs as the cost of factor endowments rose in the 1970s.  Many of these 
companies’ products are commodities in nature, and the increasing cost of such activities has 
led to a dispersion of their production. As one manager said, 
“It is important to be close to our markets….we have to think about the breakeven point 
between transportation and the benefits of consolidation of our market units…we are a cost-
driven industry, so it is important to be near our customers”. 
 
However such resource-seeking FDI tends to have very low R&D activity associated 
with it, if any, and the nature of the industry means that R&D can continue to be done 
                                                 
16 When asked to estimate their position vis-à-vis their competitors, many of the respondents said, ‘we are 
number.. in Europe’, but these respondents were generally unable to indicate their global ranking. 
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primarily at home. In the case of Group B firms, their small size has also limited their 
international activities.  
 Taking Table 3 and 4 together, it is possible to say that Group A firms have 
decentralised their production activities but continue to concentrate their R&D activities, 
while Group B firms have a more centralised production, but more geographically dispersed 
R&D activities.  It is important to note that the size of Norwegian-controlled overseas R&D 
activities are quite small in terms of absolute size. The largest R&D facility outside Norway 
has less than 65 R&D employees (Group A, laboratory located in the EU). In North America 
and the EU, the two regions with the largest number of R&D facilities, the total number of 
R&D employees are 163 and 130 respectively. In other words, these facilities are limited in 
resources, and the intensity of activities they can undertake. 
 Thus, the differences in industrial structure of the Norwegian environment faced by 
the two groups of firms plays a significant role in determining their domestic R&D activities, 
and their international involvement. One of the primary questions in the survey was “how 
important are the following factors to your decision to maintain R&D laboratories in 
Norway?”, based on a five-point scale. These tendencies are apparent from Table 5, which 
gives details of responses by both groups of firms.  
 
***TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Group A firms clearly consider proximity to production units/customers as an 
important determinant of the location of their R&D activities in Norway, with 66% indicating 
that it was of major or crucial importance. As discussed above, a majority of their strategic 
value-adding facilities remain concentrated in Norway, and it is reasonable to expect that this 
plays an important role in keeping their R&D centralised at home. In addition, a high 
concentration in process industries makes decentralisation less important. By contrast, only 
28.6% of Group B firms felt it was a significant factor, despite the fact that most of these 
firms also maintain a significant (and major share) of their production activities at home. As 
we have discussed in the theoretical discussion, their technology-intensive nature means that 
their need to seek complementary assets and specialised resources increase their need to 
internationalise.  
For similar reasons, access to raw materials and inputs is a much more significant 
factor for firms in Group A, with 33.3% of  firms regarding it of major or crucial importance 
to maintaining R&D facilities in Norway (Table 5). This reflects, once again, the importance 
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of input costs to commodity based industries. In addition, former import-substituting firms 
have enjoyed ownership advantages which are location-specific, and not as easily duplicated 
in overseas locations. With reduced or withdrawn state protection, these firms are more 
conscious of the input costs, since profit margins have been considerably affected by 
competition (most of which comes from inward FDI17). As for Group B firms, only 7.1% 
considered Norway as an important location for R&D because of easy access to inputs. In 
some cases, as much as 80% of their inputs are imported from countries in other parts of 
Europe, and the far east. They are engaged in high value-added sectors, and the transportation 
costs are negligible in relation to their costs. In general though, for both groups (but 
particularly for Group B) in terms of R&D activities, inputs are a very small cost of 
innovatory activity.   
Norwegian firms do not, in general, consider Norway to be a useful place from which 
to monitor the technological activities of competitors (Table 5). Indeed, when asked to list 
their major competitors, none of the firms in the survey included any firms located in 
Norway18.  
Both groups of firms of firms showed a strikingly similar response regarding the 
proximity of suppliers to the location of R&D (Table 5). Despite the similarity, the reasons for 
undertaking outsourcing of the two groups is considerably different and reflects technology-
specific characteristics (see Narula 1999b for a discussion). In the case of traditional industry 
firms, for instance, because of the maturity of their sectors, and the fact that competition is not 
based on access to unique technologies, a higher level of external technological outsourcing is 
feasible. Competitive advantage in these industries generally derives not from technology per 
se, where the products are 'generic', but from marketing and economies of scale. Indeed, one 
firm explained: 
"We have nothing to hide. We believe in sharing all our technologies, because we 
don’t really have anything special. There isn't much that our competitors don’t already have, 
and its really a small circle - everyone knows everyone else - we have all been in this industry 
                                                 
17 Kvinge and Narula (2000) examine the growth of foreign companies in Norway, and note that there is a higher 
concentration of foreign firms in sectors that were formerly protected.  
18 Although inward FDI into Norway has grown quite considerably over the last two decades, a considerable 
amount of FDI is still import-substituting in character, and tends to have low R&D intensity, except where 
access to Norwegian markets was provided with the condition that R&D be undertaken . As we have noted 
earlier, there is a high concentration of R&D activities in four foreign MNEs, which are engaged in domestic 
production (again as a result of previous import-substituting and targeted industry initiatives) of capital 
equipment for power generation and telecommunications. However, a study by Benito (2000), however, noted 
that 42.7% of the firms in his survey of 255 foreign subsidiaries regarded development as an activity undertaken 
in Norway, and 25.1% regarded research as part of their profile. Given the high concentration of R&D 
expenditures by foreign firms, It would suggest that the R&D activities of a majority of foreign MNEs is on a 
rather small scale.  
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a long time. Things change very slowly, and we make most of our profits from downstream 
activities. Maybe our core asset is our marketing and logistics department." 
 
****TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Table 6 gives the distribution of level of R&D outsourcing undertaken by the different 
groups of firms. Group A firms use an average of 27.4% of their R&D budget to undertake 
R&D outsourcing and alliances, compared with Group B, who on average spend 18.2% of 
their budget on non-internal R&D. There are two reasons for this significant difference. First, 
there are demand related reasons. It is important to remember that Group A firms are raw 
materials and intermediate goods suppliers, and tend to undertake a lot of collaboration in 
R&D simply because they need to do so: it is in the nature of being a supplier to subsidize the 
R&D of the customer: 
 
 "If there is a new [standard], for instance, its good for us. We have to design new 
machinery or adapt existing equipment for our major customers. It means more orders. But it 
also means we have to make the R&D investment. If we don't, a competitor will, and they will 
get all the orders. Margins are tight, because we have a long-term relationship, so we never 
question the wisdom [of subsidising the R&D of customers]."  
 
Second, Group B firms are also less able to outsource R&D to other firms because 
they are engaged in more rapidly-evolving technologies, and are close to the state-of-the art. 
Because of this, the technology has a more tacit, uncodified element to it.  Thus, to use non-
internal means would require giving away their competitive advantage: to give a supplier firm 
enough knowledge to act as an efficient supplier might create a possible competitor (Narula 
1999). In addition, SMEs are also constrained by resources as to the number of technologies 
in which they can maintain in-house competence. Most technology –intensive sectors 
nowadays require firms to be multi-technology firms. Besides, not all technologies are equally 
strategic (Granstand et al 1997).  
Outsourcing for SMEs in general is not a matter of choice, but of need. They are 
forced to consider cost issues to a greater extent than larger firms. In addition, SMEs in our 
survey are engaged in (more) competitive sectors, where technological change is much more 
rapid, and where they have to compete with foreign MNEs with more resources. It is these 
companies that dictate the rate of new product introduction. New products must be generated 
at the same rate as the other players if these firms are to survive.  
 The results suggest there are distinctive differences between the two groups. Group A 
firms operate in less technology intensive sectors, and are, by and large, in process-type 
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industries and based on traditional commodity type inputs, in which Norway has traditionally 
had a comparative advantage, and in which clusters exist, and for which the domestic 
innovation systems are more comprehensive19. Thus, firms in these sectors are larger in terms 
of sales and production, but less R&D intensive. Although changing factor costs, and the high 
costs of transportation relative to value added have promoted international production, R&D 
is by and large concentrated at home. This is in part a function of the industry – the 
technology that these firms engage in are mature and slow-evolving. Firms have less need to 
be geographically proximate to their production activities compared to more R&D intensive, 
rapidly evolving industries. In addition, though, because of these technological characteristics, 
firms can seek to acquire assets through outsourcing, more so than Group B firms.  
As for Group B firms, they are engaged in more technology-intensive sectors, and are 
predominantly SMEs. Their technological profile is in sectors which are more rapidly 
evolving. These are sectors where Norway has not got a comparative advantage. However, a 
number of them operate in industries or operated in sectors in which clusters and/or 
competitive advantages existed in the past, or which were targeted sectors in previous 
industrial policy. Thus, while fragments of clusters or ‘incomplete’ domestic innovation 
systems exist for these firms, by virtue of the fact that their markets are more global than 
European, they have sought to internationalise relatively more in terms of R&D, since they 
need access to a larger variety of technologies, and which are not as easily available through 
arms-length modes such as technology outsourcing and alliances. In addition, important 
demand factors exist, as in many cases they act as suppliers to larger firms, many of which are 
not based in Norway.  However, they demonstrate low level of overseas production in terms 
geographic spread. This may be a result of one of two factors. First, by virtue of their smaller 
size, they simply cannot afford to internationalise to the extent that they might prefer. Second, 
because of the more knowledge-intensive nature of their activities and their dominant market 
positions, transportation costs do not play as critical a role in their location decisions.  
 
‘Systemic’ Lock-in: dependence on the innovation system 
 
The last section examined the general trends with regards to the internationalisation of 
Norwegian firms, and submitted that the low level of Norwegian-controlled overseas R&D 
was determined to a large extent by the industrial structure and policies of Norway. The two-
track nature of Norway’s firms, both in terms of R&D intensity and size clearly reflects itself 
                                                 
19 Although this is not always the case, some firms have also enjoyed hitherto protected domestic markets. 
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in the non-internationalisation of R&D. In addition, we suggested that home country factors 
play a decisive role, in particular those associated with the innovation systems of Norway. In 
this section we explore more explicitly a few aspects that cause this ‘inertia’ of R&D 
associated with the home country innovation systems. It is clear from the preceding 
discussion that although there are differences between the two groups, even Group B firms are 
also home-country focused in their R&D activities. A majority of the firms in both groups, for 
instance, regard the technical and scientific infrastructure in Norway to be an important factor 
for undertaking R&D in Norway (Table 5).  In this section we will try and examine this issue 
closer.  
It is not within the scope of the current paper to make a thorough analysis of 
Norwegian innovation systems, but to illustrate our primary thesis that home country effects 
play a significant role in the ‘inertia’ question. In particular, we focus on two issues and their 
influence on the location of R&D activities of Norwegian firms: the institute and university 
sector, and the role of the state in terms of funding and policy. Indeed, these two are closely 
intertwined, and although there are other aspects of the innovation systems that have some 
bearing on the location of R&D, for reasons of space these will suffice in illustrating our 
arguments.  
 As in all countries, the primary participants in the Norwegian R&D system comprise 
of three players: private sector firms, the higher education sector, and the institute sector 
(Hauknes 1996). These institute and universities sectors together undertake roughly the same 
level of R&D activities in terms of R&D expenditure as the industry sector20. The significance 
of the institutes and universities is derived from the fact that they form the major means by 
which the state – directly and indirectly - subsidises R&D activities. 62% of the funding of the 
institutes  and 88% of that of the universities come from public sources (NIFU, 1999).  
The level of subsidies provided by the state are by themselves not exceptional, but the 
active and central role that the state has in determining how these funds are spent, and whom 
they are directed towards. As we have highlighted before, the state has always played a strong 
interventionist role in Norwegian industry21. The importance of government intervention was 
evident from our interviews, although neither group of firms considered government pressure 
                                                 
20 in 1997 the universities had an expenditure of NOK 4845 million, the institute sector of NOK 4826 million, 
and the enterprise sector of NOK 8517 million. 
21 The extent to which the state continues to intervene is highlighted by a recent development, where Norsk 
Hydro decided to sell its aquaculture business to a Dutch MNE, apparently, despite the objections of the 
Norwegian government. Labour, the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats all expressed views to the effect 
that this sale could affect Hydro’s chances of receiving new shares in the State Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) 
in the petroleum sector (Dagsavisen, 6 April 2000). 
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as a primary factor in maintaining R&D facilities in Norway (Table 5). However, Group A 
firms, regard government pressure to maintain R&D activity as a much more important factor 
than Group B, with a quarter of the respondents regarding it as being of major or crucial 
importance – unsurprising given the fact that many of these firms are either state-owned or 
national champions.  
The different attitudes towards R&D may also partly be as a result of the way in which 
public subsidies are provided to industry. A large share (42% in 1997) of R&D expenditures 
are provided by the public sources. Much of this is directed towards the institute sector and 
the higher education sector (just over 92% in 1997). The State directly funded industry to the 
tune of NOK 535.8 million in 1997, or almost 6.2% of the total business expenditures in R&D 
in that year. Until 1992, funding of R&D was undertaken by a variety of research councils, 
each controlled by different ministries. The Norwegian Research Council (NFR) was 
established as an attempt to bring together under one umbrella all the various R&D funding 
and policy making agencies (Skoie 1997), thereby improving coordination, and increasing 
efficiency. At the same time, the objective was to improve the links between basic and applied 
research.  However, ministries still approve and fund projects independently of the NFR – this 
is indicated by the fact that the direct funding of industry by the NFR is only about 25% of the 
total public funding of industry R&D (NIFU 1999)22. The structure of funding towards the 
larger ‘national champions’ is evident. The objectives of various programs is steered by 
committees where managers from these companies have a significant presence, and they are 
thus able to influence the design of research themes. Smaller companies tend to have more 
difficulty in accessing funding directly, partly because of the lack of transparency of NFR 
programs, and the large amount of bureaucracy23. A manager of one of the larger firms said,  
 
“NFR should cut down on bureaucracy and paperwork - big companies like [ours] can handle 
the amount of effort it requires. But companies which really need the funding, are not able to 
handle this…it pays to have professional people who are very [skilled] in seeking 
money…big companies can always make your proposal directed to [what is advertised in the 
program descriptions] , because they helped to design the programs…small companies do not 
have these possibilities…” 
                                                 
22 Some of this funding goes through the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND). The 
SND is not primarily oriented towards supporting R&D, but is concerned with firm development, particularly in 
promoting their location in the (non-urban) regions of Norway.  
23 Even though a large amount of funding from NFR is ostensibly earmarked for SMEs, the general consensus 
from interviews was that much of the funding for SMEs was directed towards projects which involved activities 
by SMEs in their role as suppliers to large firms. In addition, the definition of SMEs used in Norway – less than 
200 employees - excluded a large number of internationally competitive companies from accessing funds. 
However, because of the way in which data is collected, evidence for this is primarily anecdotal (see 
Christiansen, Moller and Smith 1996). 
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Another firm said that, “All the paperwork  [for the NFR] makes [the funding we get from the 
NFR] almost not worth it. But we have to, because we must be ‘invited to the party’. It’s a 
club, and we can’t afford not to be a member of this club.” 
 
The survey enquired about the average level of NFR funding made available to these 
firms during the last 5 years. Firms from Group A as a whole are afforded more R&D 
subsidies than those engaged in newer, competence-based technologies and sectors. As Table 
3 shows, firms in Group A received a larger share of public share of R&D funding: 3.0% vs 
1.2%, on a weighted average basis24. These figures exclude direct and indirect subsidies 
channelled through other agencies. It should also be noted that Group A includes a number of 
former monopolies, which have had a drastic reduction in their subsidies in line with 
conditions imposed by the EEA and WTO agreements and which have a weighted average 
NFR subsidy of just 0.6%.  
The Norwegian higher education system sector consists of four universities and a 
number of ‘scientific colleges’ which provide tertiary education at a university level. 
Although all perform R&D type activities, only one university dominates postgraduate 
engineering and technology-related education: the Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology (NTNU). It  graduates upwards of a 1000 engineers with masters level education, 
and 130 PhD’s in engineering every year. These provide the backbone of R&D personnel in 
Norwegian research establishments. The University of Oslo (UiO) plays a role in providing 
R&D personnel in basic and natural sciences, as well as information technologies, but its 
contribution is clearly secondary to that of NTNU. NTNU, which is located in Trondheim is 
also intimately linked with SINTEF, the crown jewel of the institute sector, providing a 
considerable part of the laboratory facilities for SINTEF. In addition, about 180 NTNU 
professors are employed as scientific advisors to SINTEF. NTNU’s links with industry are 
unparalleled by any other university in Norway, accounting for an estimated 15% of the total 
amount of R&D outsourced (in terms of expenditure) by our sample. This figure does not 
include funding which comes through projects undertaken jointly by SINTEF and NTNU.  
The institute sector consists of approximately 15 technological research institutes and 
30 social research institutes, and reflects the various stages of Norwegian industrial policy 
over the post world war II years. They can be classified into 4 main groups. First, there are the 
‘collective’ industry–specific research institutes. These are based around particular sectoral 
                                                 
24 Weighted averages adjust for the effect of smaller The unweighted average percentages are 6.3% and 3.7% for 
Group A and Group B respectively. 
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interests. For instance, the pulp and paper industry sponsors the pulp and paper institute. 
Second, there are the ‘modernisation’ institutes which were established as a part of the policy 
strategy to upgrade and develop particular industries which were deemed as essential to create 
a modern industrial sector, beginning in the 1950s. The most prominent of these being the 
Norwegian Defence Research Institute (FFI), the Central Institute for Industrial Research (SI), 
Telenor (TF) and the Institute for Atomic Energy (IFA). The third group are the regional 
institutes which are linked to local university-level colleges with the intention of developing 
and supporting local industry in the various regions of Norway, and linking them to the 
regional tertiary level colleges. The fourth group of institutes evolved in response to new 
targeted industries (in particular petroleum, and later electronics),  but over time have evolved 
and merged, and are now based around what is essentially now SINTEF. The SINTEF group 
was established by the Norwegian Institute of Technology (NTH), the predecessor to NTNU, 
in 1950 in response to the government’s decision to establish SI (Hauknes 1996). By the 
1970s, a number of the institutes had lost their raison d’etre, for a variety of reasons. A 
decline in defence spending and the end of the cold war has reduced the strategic importance 
of IFA and FFI, while TF, became part of Telenor, the state-owned telecomm former 
monopoly. Other institutions from the first and second group also merged with SINTEF. The 
SINTEF group has evolved to what is arguably the largest R&D laboratory in Northern 
Europe (Skoie, 1997), with over 1800 employees (84% of whom are technicians, engineers 
and scientists) and a turnover of almost NOK 1.5 billion. It is by far the largest R&D 
performer in Norway. It undertakes roughly 60% of the R&D outsourced by our sample, 
whereas all the other institutes and universities (excluding NTNU) combined undertake less 
than 15% of total research outsourced by our sample, and probably closer to 10%. Foreign 
institutes account for approximately 5%. The link between SINTEF and NTNU is quite 
clearly a strong one, and the two cannot be viewed as separate, given their joint R&D 
facilities and shared staff, and the historical link between the two25. SINTEF is organised 8 
research areas26, and also controls 4 stock research companies27. Given the closeness of 
                                                 
25 Some attempt has been made recently to regard SINTEF as being of two parts, SINTEF A, which undertakes 
joint activity and utilises resources of the two, and SINTEF B, which is less dependent on the NTNU 
relationship. 
26 As of 1999, these were as follows (approximate turnover given in brackets): Applied chemistry (NOK 148 
million), applied mathematics (NOK 36 million), civil and environmental engineering (NOK 168 million), 
electronics and cybernetics (NOK 89 million), industrial management (NOK 146 million), materials technology 
(163 million), telecom and informatics (NOK 105 million), medical (NOK 101 million). 
27 SINTEF petroleum research (100% owned, SINVENT (100% owned), MARINTEK (jointly owned with 
Veritas, and the ship industry association), and SINTEF energy research (jointly owned with energy research 
organisation and the electrical industry association).  
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SINTEF and NTNU, and the high concentration of non-firm R&D activities that are industry-
oriented in these two players (between 70 and 80%), it is practical to view them as a singe 
entity, sometimes referred to here as the SINTEF-NTNU axis. The primary rationale for the 
very strong, centralised (and concentrated) nature of the institute sector in Norway has been to 
create economies of scale and scope in research. This reasoning is still in vogue today. As a 
manager at SINTEF explained, 
“There are a large number of SMEs in Norway that cannot afford to maintain dedicated R&D 
facilities of the scale and scope that is required to compete with their international 
competitors. [In addition]…doing so would mean that facilities and resources would be under-
utilised. SINTEF can undertake similar activities for many firms at the same time, and thus be 
cost and resource efficient”.  
 
 This policy of centralisation of research was meant to allow firms to maintain a 
smaller amount of internal R&D, and rely on external (domestic) sources of research, in 
particular, SMEs. Indeed, funding by the NFR to firms is largely provided with the 
understanding that these funds will be utilised at one of the Norwegian research institutes, and 
not abroad. This means that broadly speaking, smaller firms undertake only market-related 
development activities, leaving the applied research and development to the institutes28. 
 This high centralisation of activities also has a very important centripetal effect on 
R&D. Almost all the technical personnel engaged in R&D are graduates of NTNU. 70% of 
the managers in my interviews (both firms and institutes) were also graduates from NTNU. 
On the one hand, this creates a sort of informal network between firms, as most of the 
personnel know each other, or know of each other, allowing for a greater flow of knowledge 
between firms and between firms and institutes.  
Firms (or more accurately, technical personnel in these firms) are likely to recruit 
other engineers and scientists who come from this network. In addition, the larger firms have 
considerable influence on the curriculum and nature of the educational system within NTNU, 
and are thus able to influence the quality of people. One manager put it nicely,  
 
"Norway is very important to us, not because Norwegians are smarter than other people, but 
because we know the culture here, and we know where to get people…it’s a practical 
issue….we can put pressure on the universities to change their profile. We could not do this 
elsewhere without considerable time and effort...". 
 
                                                 
28 In theory, this frees the universities to focus on basic research. However, the consistent under funding of 
universities means that competent researchers at universities also compete for research funding from NFR and 
others, and engage in more applied research than basic research. In addition, funding for open-ended (and more 
basic, non-project related work) R&D by SINTEF has also been considerably cut over the years, and they also 
undertake less basic research. 
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However, it should be noted that the ability to influence the curriculum is something 
that only Group A-type firms have, given their larger size and economic clout. Larger firms 
tend not only to get graduates tailored to their specifications, but also are able to recruit the 
best students. Large firms also invested in sponsoring visiting professors and researchers from 
other countries in research themes that they felt needed to be developed, something which 
SMEs could not afford to do. One firm explained that the main reason for having R&D 
facilities in Trondheim was to be close to NTNU, 
“Trondheim is the capital of research in technology….we have found that we can recruit from 
the top shelf [because we are located in Trondheim].  We find the best candidates before they 
finish. We finance [the dissertation work of] individuals whose research interests match 
ours...[because we know the professors] we know who are the best [candidates], and establish 
[a] connection with them early. It is a major responsibility [of mine] to handpick the best 
people every year”.  
 
Indeed, both Groups regarded Norway very highly in terms of availability of high 
quality research professionals, with 91.6% of firms in Group A, and 85.7% of firms in Group 
B regarding it as of major or crucial importance (Table 5).  
The evidence would suggest that Norwegian firms are ‘locked-in’ to the Norwegian 
innovation systems, and this restricts their activities, both on a technological and an 
organisational sense. On an organisational level, firms are heavily dependent on the 
Norwegian system, since they have traditionally relied on these assets, and are reluctant to try 
new options. Inter alia, this is because the search procedure to find an optimal alternative 
source is expensive, and the high costs and considerable time required to develop new 
linkages with alternative research institutions makes such an attempt out of reach of all except 
the largest firms. An a priori familiarity with outside sources does, of course, help. Several of 
the R&D managers interviewed who had studied in other countries were more inclined to 
using non-Norwegian institutes. One of the Swedish -trained manager of an SME (which no 
longer undertakes any work with the SINTEF-NTNU axis) said, 
“When I first took over we spent NOK 10 million in [Norway], but we didn’t get anything out 
of it, so we now use research institutes in Sweden and [other countries] where I know.. [where 
to go], and where we will get what we need.” 
 
Firms from both groups that have more international experience in terms of production 
activities and are larger in terms of size are also more likely to use alternative (which in this 
case means non-Norwegian) sources of R&D suppliers and new employees. They have learnt 
about alternative innovation systems and are more familiar with operating in the host 
environments, because they are linked with them, and have the resources to develop these 
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linkages further. However, the organisational lock-in with Norwegian systems is not 
necessarily forsaken:  
“we are currently establishing a technical centre in the US - but we are trying always to 
strengthen with SINTEF and NTNU. We sponsor people from Trondheim to go abroad to do 
joint research, give lectures, and attract professors and researchers to come from [these other 
institutes]. We sponsor Norwegian students to study [at other institutions abroad where we 
have identified competences that we need]”.  
 
In terms of costs ,SINTEF, NTNU are worth it - if you can keep them on track. …but they 
have more competition - we have found more and more institutes outside [Norway] with 
competence. But of course [SINTEF-NTNU] are Norwegian and they are close 
by….nonetheless, we are not increasing their share [of our R&D outsourcing efforts], but 
increasing [our purchases from] outside Norway.   
 
The second aspect of lock-in creates a ‘technological inertia’. As we have highlighted 
earlier, technological specialisation of countries changes only very gradually. Norway has 
over a period of almost a century focused on low-technology, resource based sectors. 
Although knowledge-intensive sectors have received considerable government attention, these 
sectors (in particular those associated with electronics-based sectors) have not developed into 
a large enough agglomeration, and are largely incomplete clusters, nor has the government 
succeeded in creating any large national champions. This situation has probably not been 
helped by the change in the emphasis in policy over the decades. For instance, the most recent 
shift since the 1980s has been from telecommunications and electronics to software.  Many of 
the companies that have survived these ‘reshuffles’ have either become associated with one of 
the more complete clusters, or they have been acquired by larger major international players 
in their industry, such as Nycomed. The following observations by Group B companies 
illustrates the unevenness of the system: 
"[the quality of] education is very bad, particularly in our areas of technology. Research 
funding in [our] industry has been reduced to 40% , universities are lacking resources, and 
professor salaries are so low that recruitment is impossible in universities.  Many of the 
students...don't meet the standards for taking up technical education…." 
 
"There is…far too much raw-material based focus [in the way research is funded]. We as a 
small country, with high level of education, we should be competing much more on 
competence base than raw material base.  The only so-called competence based areas [in 
Norway are traditional sectors] like shipping...we are really pumping that oil, digging that 
mine...not adding value to the resources…its the wrong way of using the resources”. 
 
"The government needs to promote reasons to stay - if not for our history [our company] 
would be better off somewhere else.  The lack of competence level....is coming from the [low 
quality of] education.  It won’t help to pour in more money [to subsidise R&D], if the [human 
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resources] to receive it are not competent to deal with it. [in R&D we] need to start with the 
people, that there is someone professional to do the thing. Of course there are good 
professionals [in our area] in Norway, but this is in spite of the government. " 
 
In addition though, because of significantly large players in the traditional industries, 
competitiveness built over a long period, their ability to shape the Norwegian system of 
innovation to their needs, Norwegian firms in these sectors are locked in a virtuous circle of 
technological competitiveness (Cantwell 1987). In other words, firms are technologically 
locked-in to superior (or at least state-of-the-art) technologies.   
 While the outcome of ‘technological inertia’ may be positive, it may just as easily 
lead to a vicious circle.  Where clusters exist and the threshold level of support and synergies 
exist from (and between) suppliers and related firms, institutions, universities, government, 
and resources, thereby establishing technological state-of-the-art, then the outcome is superior 
and optimal. Where these factors are incomplete, or interact in a sub-optimal way, then the 
technological level in the location may be locked into inferior (or lagging, non-state-of-the-
art) technologies. Where a critical level of competence does not exist, firms are also locked in 
to inferior technologies. This is enhanced in the case of new technologies. By virtue of being 
a small country with one (albeit large) technological university, there are a fewer number of 
professors, and the research themes and approaches of their research groups are constrained. 
The same, rather small group of professors, will, simply by the path dependence of their 
specialisation, tend to generate new PhD’s with roughly the same interests and skills. In other 
words, the lack of diversity by virtue of a small group of researchers limits the diversity of 
new ideas and technologies, even where a high competence level exists. Where the system is 
supported by inward technology transfer by MNEs which sponsor cooperation between 
foreign sources of knowledge and the domestic sources, this problem is minimised. It helps, 
of course, that these areas are relatively slow-evolving, mature sectors. Where technological 
change is rapid, and firms do not have the resources to help augment the domestic 
technological base, firms will necessarily seek external sources directly, without improving 
the domestic scientific infrastructure. Even for Group A firms, getting the right people is not 
as easy. As one manager explained, its not just educational levels that count, but experience: 
 
“Its easy to get people from universities, but we prefer people who have been working 1-3 
years after their PhD, because its takes 2-3 years before they are really producing... Its 
becoming more difficult to find people with experience….we are increasingly appointing 
people from outside Norway". 
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 Some companies have tried to resolve this matter by seeking to bring in expatriate 
researchers, but this option has had limited success. In certain areas like biotechnology, there 
are simply not enough domestic researchers available. One firm recently advertised repeatedly 
for new scientists in Norway and abroad, but only produced one applicant from abroad, who 
is of Norwegian background, and no responses from within Norway. The reasons for this are 
associated with relatively low salaries (in purchasing power terms, and relative to salaries 
offered to similarly qualified researchers in other countries), the climate and the remoteness of 
Norway. Several Norwegian laboratories have, nonetheless several expatriate researchers.  
“To have the right people, we have to pay the market price…Norwegian salaries are lower…it 
is easier to move to London or Paris or Rome where we [would be] much closer to sources of 
educated and experienced people…”. 
 
Policy implications and conclusions 
While accepting the fact that strategic and other firm-specific factors are central to explaining 
the internationalisation of innovatory activities, we have argued here that the industrial 
specialisation of firms and the location of their technological activities is heavily influenced 
by country-specific factors. This is part of a wider phenomenon: firms of all nationalities 
display an ‘inertia’ in R&D internationalisation and are more reluctant to internationalise 
R&D than other aspects of their value-adding activity, such as sales and production. The level 
of internationalisation is also industry-specific. However, in the aggregate, firms of some 
nationalities show a higher reluctant to do so. It has been our objective in this paper to explain 
why. 
We have argued here that this added cumulative inertia is associated with the nature of 
the innovation systems of their home countries, and the level to which these firms are locally 
embedded and the extent to which interdependent and co-dependent on domestic institutions 
and policies which have not only formed them, and with which they are most familiar, but 
which they have helped create.  
The case of Norway illustrates this well. Norwegian industry can be viewed as 
consisting of two groups of firms with distinguishably different characteristics. The first 
group of firms (Group A) are national champions and tend to be large, engaged in traditional 
resource-intensive sectors in which Norway has had a historical comparative advantage. They 
enjoy a certain amount of government patronage, and are highly embedded in Norway. It can 
be argued that the NSI of Norway has been built around these firms. It should be noted that 
these firms are largely successful business enterprises, and their larger size and longevity is 
not unrelated to this. Group B firms operate in more technology-intensive, science based 
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sectors, and tend to be SMEs. These firms have evolved in part as a result of various industrial 
policy initiative to create clusters in more knowledge-intensive sectors, but which –as 
industrial clusters – failed to achieve sufficient impetus. Group A also consists of firms have 
moved further upstream over time, as comparative advantages have changed. Group A firms 
are relatively much less internationalised in both sales production and R&D than Group B 
firms. 
We have argued that, because of their economic and political significance, Group A 
are able to adapt the innovation system to their changing needs, while Group B firms have not 
had the resources to do so. In addition though, the industrial specialisation of Group A is in 
mature and slow-evolving industries, while Group B are in more rapidly developing sectors, 
which require multiple competences. Thus, the need to seek additional resources abroad has 
been greater. 
We need to emphasise here that our analysis of inertia in R&D is not to suggest 
whether it is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ per se: Certain sectors are more amenable to internationalisation 
than others, and as long as the NSI meet the needs of home-based firms, there is nothing 
‘wrong’ with a systemic interdependence between actors within the NSI, and a consequent 
home-bias. However, when the NSI does not meet the needs of firms in certain industries, it 
affects their technological competitiveness. When firms exhibit systemic lock-in to an NSI 
and it retards or hinders firms’ attempts to compensate for weaknesses in the domestic NSI by 
tapping other locations’ NSI, it can be ‘bad’.   
We have suggested that SOEs can, under certain circumstances be locked in a vicious 
circle of technological accumulation, or what we have termed ‘technological inertia’. No 
country can possibly expect to provide world-class competences in all technological fields. 
Even the largest, most technologically advanced countries cannot provide strong innovation 
systems to all their industries, and world class competences in all technological fields. The 
cross-border flow of ideas is something that has always been seen as fundamental to firms, 
and this imperative has increased with growing cross-border competition, and international 
production. 
However, some countries that have regarded imported technologies as a sign of 
national weakness, and have sought to maintain and develop in-country competences, often 
regardless of the cost. The strategy of technological self-sufficiency is increasingly untenable 
as SOEs have limited resources. They must either spread their resources thinly across many 
technological competences or concentrate on a few. Norway, again, illustrates this well. As a 
SOE, there are by definition a limited number of researchers, and assuming a normal 
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distribution, there are an even smaller number of world-class professors, scientists and 
engineers. It is reasonable to expect that these researchers will produce like-minded graduates, 
thereby doubly constraining the number of new ideas. Relying on in-country competences 
may lead to a sub-optimal strategy, especially in this age of multi-technology products. Group 
A firms avoid this by sponsoring the flow of new ideas by importing researchers to 
supplement Norwegian researchers and encouraging Norwegian scientists to travel abroad to 
collaborate. SMEs in Group B cannot afford to do so, and are more likely to internationalise 
their innovative activities as a means to seek new ideas. However, even this option is 
expensive, since SMEs are limited by the amount of resources they can commit to the 
internationalisation of R&D, because R&D is not only costly and risky, it requires a certain 
minimum scale to be efficient. 
In addition, though, even Group B firms are reluctant to internationalise, because of 
what we have termed ‘organisational inertia’. This is because of a very Norway-specific, but 
also typical of many other countries. Norwegian firms and researchers are members of the 
same – relatively small - ‘club’ and have developed informal relationships over a long period 
of time. The need for alliances and other more formal interactions between buyers and 
suppliers is considerably reduced, since a high level of trust and interdependence already 
exists, and in a small community, costs of shirking are very high. Furthermore, managers and 
scientists are not always familiar with other options, and are more risk-averse than might 
otherwise be the case. 
Despite these factors, there has been a growing R&D internationalisation, admittedly 
still at a nascent stage. This is because there is a growing mismatch between what home 
locations can provide and what firms require. In general, national innovation systems and 
industrial and technological specialisation of countries changes only very gradually, and – 
especially in newer, rapidly evolving sectors - much more slowly than the technological needs 
of firms. Firms must seek either to import and acquire the technology they need from abroad, 
or venture abroad and seek to internalise aspects of other countries’ innovation systems. There 
is a third option – that of firms seeking to modify the home-country innovation system – 
which is expensive, and difficult to sustain in the long run. 
Although the focus of this paper has been on home-country factors, it is important to 
emphasise the crucial importance of ‘pull’ factors. These have been noted here and elsewhere 
in the literature. In addition to proximity to markets and production units, firms also venture 
abroad to seek economies of agglomeration. In general, firms in industries with incomplete 
clusters will either evolve their technological specialisation towards a more complete 
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industrial cluster, or they will relocate their activities to a geographic location where a more 
complete cluster exists. They can do so either by being passive and be acquired or merge with 
a firm with access to more complete clusters, or by relocating their locus by 
internationalisation. They have two other options, both of which are much less palatable, one 
of which is to die slowly, the other to re-orient their activity towards stronger domestic 
clusters. 
There are two options available to governments. First, they can intervene and attempt 
to micro-manage the economy. This, by all accounts, is what the Norwegian government has 
sought to do, by trying to pick sectors to support, and the creation of national champions. 
However, this option can only be partially successful, because it is expensive, and thus not 
sustainable on the long term. Despite the best efforts of governments, they cannot always pick 
national champions who will be ‘winners’ at the technological frontier, because by definition, 
the potential of one technological paradigm over another is very much unpredictable. In 
addition, small country governments have limited resources, and not just financial capital. 
One of the primary reasons firms go abroad is to seek diversity of ideas and knowledge. This 
cannot be overcome through techno-nationalism.  
The second option open to policy makers is to accept the inevitable and help firms 
overcome market failure in markets for knowledge, as well as reduce the inherent risks of 
internationalisation. This requires a very pro-active industrial policy, which includes, but is by 
no means limited to the following: 
1. The most important issue is to supplement domestic knowledge sources with foreign 
ones. The need to seek diversity in knowledge is paramount. In the case of Norway – 
as in most SOEs – allowing for the cross-border flow of new ideas through human 
capital is by far the most cost-effective means.  
2. Allow for, and encourage, competition in the outsourcing of R&D. In the Norwegian 
case, this means that government funding should be provided for firms to acquire the 
best technologies wherever and from whomever they might be available, not just 
Norwegian sources. 
3. Reduce the risks associated with internationalisation of knowledge for SMEs.  
4. Most important, provide industry with the means to internalise and absorb 
technologies and ideas acquired from elsewhere, which is to create a skilled workforce 
of international quality. This means investing more in the quality of tertiary education, 
and the quality of basic research undertaken by these institutions. 
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Internationalisation of innovatory activities is fundamentally associated with the search for 
diversity. There is nothing wrong with the internationalisation of R&D, from the point of 
view of public policy. Indeed, it may well be a good thing, since firms will invariably bring 
back more than they take.  
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Notes. (1)Arrows indicate movement over the previous 5-10 years; (2)Companies in bold: no 
foreseeable movement (3) Inclusion of companies in this diagram does not necessarily indicate 
participation in our survey: Information based on publicly available information. 
 
Figure 1:  changing level of knowledge content and government protection and 
specialisation of Norwegian firms 
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Figure 2: overseas sales by type of industry 
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Table 1  R&D expenditures of surveyed firms
 (%)
million NOK
< 5 34.6
5-9.99 23.1
10-30 11.5
30-50 23.1
>50 7.7
total 100
n 26
mean 208
sum 5415
BERD in million NOK (1997) 8600
share of BERD 63%
estimated share 
of total Norwegian
controlled R&D 70-80%
Table 2: distribution of surveyed firms, number of firms and worldwide revenues
% of firms
All firms All firms Group A Group B
Chemicals, pharmaceuticals and biotech 26.9 5.8 3.6 33.3
mechanical equipment 0.0 0.0 0 0
Metals and fabricated metals 15.4 51.5 55.5 0
Other low tech sectors 23.1 37.0 36.3 46.1
aerospace +transport eqpt 3.8 0.7 0.8 0
control  and measuring eqpt 15.4 1.0 0 13.4
 electronic, office and telecomms eqpt 15.4 4.0 3.8 7.2
Total 100 100.0 100.0 100.0
Low tech including metals 38.5 88.5 91.8 46.1
electronics based sectors 30.8 5.0 3.8 20.6
% of ww sales
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Table 3: selected indicators, sample split into two Groups
% of employees % of employees engaged % of R&D employees NFR subsidies as 
Total employees worldwide worldwide revenues (MNOK) in R&D in R&D outside Norway outside Norway % of R&D budget
Group A 52000.0 13385.0 3.2% 0.2% 5.0% 3.0%
Group B 10300.0 1549.0 9.4% 2.7% 28.9% 1.2%
 Size 
 
Table 4: Extent of internationalisation of sales, production and R&D
% of firms % of firms % of firms % of firms % of firms % of firms
with sales with production with R&D with sales with production with R&D
in region in region in region in region in region in region
EU 90.9 72.7 27.3 100 64.3 42.9
North America 54.5 45.5 9.1 100 64.3 42.9
Latin America 72.7 45.5 0 85.7 7.1 0
Japan 45.5 18.2 0 78.6 7.1 0
Other Asia 92.9 35.7 9.1 92.9 35.7 14.3
Rest of World 91.2 72.7 9.1 78.5 14.3 0
Sales Production R&D Sales Production R&D
% of firms with 45.5 18.2 0 85.7 7.1 0
 'global' presence [1]
% of firms with 45.5 63.6 9.1 14.3 50 35.7
multinational presence [2]
[1] firms with presence in at least 5 of the 6 non-home regions  
[2] firms with presence in 2 to 4 non-home regions  
Group A Group B
 
 
Table 5: 'how important are the following factors and considerations to your decision to maintain R&D laboratories in Norway?”
GROUP A GROUP B
% of respondents % of respondents
mean 'major or crucial mean 'major or crucial
importance' importance'
Availability of researchers 4.6 91.6 4.3 85.7
Low cost of researchers 2 8.3 2.5 21.4
Proximity of production units/customers 3.6 66.6 2.5 28.6
presence of technical & scientific Infrastructure 3.4 50 3.6 57.1
access to raw materials & other inputs 2.3 33.3 1.4 7.1
monitoring the technology of competitors 1.8 16.6 1.6 14.2
presence of important suppliers 2.3 33.3 2.4 35.7
Demands/wishes of government 1.9 26.7 1.1 0
 
 
Table 6: Percentage of R&D activity externally outsourced
Average 25% or less 26-50% >50%
Group A 27.4 54.5 36.4 9.1
Group B 18.2 78.6 21.4 0
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